Edward Meredith Cope was an English scholar of classics who served as Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the leading Greek specialists of his time, Cope published An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric in 1867. Though now considered a 'standard work', that Introduction was intended as merely the first part of a full critical edition of the Rhetoric, which was left incomplete on Cope's death in 1873. Cope's manuscripts were collected and edited by John Edwin (...) Sandys, and published in this three-volume set in 1877. Cope's analysis represented an important advance in the modern interpretation of this foundational text on the art of persuasion. Volume 1 contains the Greek text of Book 1 together with a commentary on Aristotle's introduction to his topic and his definition of rhetoric and its subdivisions. (shrink)

Edward Meredith Cope was an English scholar of classics who served as Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the leading Greek specialists of his time, Cope published An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric in 1867. Though now considered a 'standard work', that Introduction was intended as merely the first part of a full critical edition of the Rhetoric, which was left incomplete on Cope's death in 1873. Cope's manuscripts were collected and edited by John Edwin (...) Sandys, and published in this three-volume set in 1877. Cope's analysis represented an important advance in the modern interpretation of this foundational text on the art of persuasion. Volume 2 contains the Greek text of Book 2 together with a commentary on Aristotle's views concerning the place of emotion and logic within the discipline. (shrink)

Edward Meredith Cope was an English scholar of classics who served as Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the leading Greek specialists of his time, Cope published An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric in 1867. Though now considered a 'standard work', that Introduction was intended as merely the first part of a full critical edition of the Rhetoric, which was left incomplete on Cope's death in 1873. Cope's manuscripts were collected and edited by John Edwin (...) Sandys, and published in this three-volume set in 1877. This major work contains the Greek text together with a commentary on Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric, including its definition and classification, the role of emotion and logic, and the relevance of style and other rhetorical techniques. Cope's analysis represented an important advance in the modern interpretation of this foundational text on the art of persuasion. (shrink)

Edward Meredith Cope was an English scholar of classics who served as Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the leading Greek specialists of his time, Cope published An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric in 1867. Though now considered a 'standard work', that Introduction was intended as merely the first part of a full critical edition of the Rhetoric, which was left incomplete on Cope's death in 1873. Cope's manuscripts were collected and edited by John Edwin (...) Sandys, and published in this three-volume set in 1877. Cope's analysis represented an important advance in the modern interpretation of this foundational text on the art of persuasion. Volume 1 contains the Greek text of Book 1 together with a commentary on Aristotle's introduction to his topic and his definition of rhetoric and its subdivisions. (shrink)

Edward Meredith Cope was an English scholar of classics who served as Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the leading Greek specialists of his time, Cope published An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric in 1867. Though now considered a 'standard work', that Introduction was intended as merely the first part of a full critical edition of the Rhetoric, which was left incomplete on Cope's death in 1873. Cope's manuscripts were collected and edited by John Edwin (...) Sandys, and published in this three-volume set in 1877. Cope's analysis represented an important advance in the modern interpretation of this foundational text on the art of persuasion. Volume 3 contains the Greek text of Book 3 together with a commentary on Aristotle's understanding of style, arrangement and other rhetorical devices. (shrink)

Actuality and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Aristotle's Revenge argues that these concepts are not only compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern science. Among the many topics covered are: the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific method; the status of scientific realism; the metaphysics of space and time; the metaphysics of quantum mechanics; reductionism in chemistry and biology; the metaphysics of evolution; neuroscientific (...) reductionism. The book interacts heavily with the literature on these issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science, so as to bring contemporary philosophy and science into dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition. (shrink)

The article investigates the treatment of modality in chapters 12 and 13 of De Interpretatione and gives a new interpretation of the puzzling table of modals to be found at the beginning of chapter 13, as well as dealing with some of Aristotle’s puzzles. This is achieved by extending Aristotle’s distinction between two senses of possibility, which (following Ackrill) I call ‘one-sided’ and ‘two-sided’, to the two notions of necessity and impossibility. The conclusion is reached that, while the (...) two notions of necessity and impossibility are logically incompatible when both are taken as one-sided, in their two-sided senses they are in fact equivalent. (shrink)

The problem of the one and the many is central to ancient Greek philosophy, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of it in the Metaphysics. The Central Books of the Metaphysics are widely recognised as the most difficult portion of a most difficult work. This title aims to examine the Central Books.

In the field of natural science, Aristotle recognizes as his forerunners a select group of theorists such as Heraclitus of Ephesus, Empedocles of Acragas, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, and Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera. In addition, he mentions in the same contexts some whose claims to be “natural philosophers” are doubtful, yet who deserve notice in the same context, including Parmenides of Elea, Melissus of Samos, the people called Pythagoreans, and Plato as the author of the Timaeus. Aristotle takes (...) seriously almost all of these people, treating them as exemplary pioneers and valuable partners in the enterprise of “natural philosophy.” This article examines earlier opinions on certain fundamental questions about the natural world, as treated in the first three books of the Physics and in the first book of the Metaphysics. In Physics II and III, Aristotle represents most if not all of his predecessors as disastrously misunderstanding, in more than one way, the nature underlying the natural world. (shrink)

Cheryl Abbate’s article in this journal makes the case that many nonhuman animals are “political” in the Aristotelian sense. Moreover, Abbate rejects the claim that anthrôpos is the most political of animals. While the aim to deflate often overexaggerated distinctions between us and other animals is laudable, in the following I suggest that Abbate’s evidence from cognitive ethology, and her application of evolutionary principles, fall short of demonstrating other animals to be as political as anthrôpos.

For Aristotle and other Greek thinkers, philosophy is itself a rethinking. There are other branches of knowledge, like medicine and mathematics, that each grasp some particular subject matter. Since philosophy or, as it has come to be called, metaphysics is the highest science, its job is to grasp somehow all the other sciences and all their subjects. If the science of a subject requires a type of thinking proper to the subject, then the science of that science requires a (...) rethinking of this and all other subjects. In this paper I explore some of Aristotle’s modes of rethinking philosophy. I am interested in the connection between rethinking philosophy and the kinds of philosophical principles that emerge from this rethinking. I argue that reflexive principles are implicit in rethinking but that theyare projected onto things for systematic reasons. Because my time is short, my discussion is limited to broad brush strokes, but there are so many textual details and so much that is contentious about them that a broad sketch may be the best way to set out my point. It is plausible to proceed this way because Aristotle’s main themes are often much clearer than the details of his discussions and my argument relies only on the broad lines of his organization. (shrink)

Probability and Frequency. Aristotle frequently used the concept of probability, but apparently he did not make any persistent effort to clarify or analyze it. His description of a fortiori argument in The Topics, e.g., depends upon “the more or less likely or probable,” but he does not explore this notion. In The Rhetoric, where he applies himself to a puzzle about probability which the Sophists had advanced, he comes closer to an analysis of probability. Aristotle quotes Agathon, One (...) might perchance say this was probable—That things improbable oft will hap to men, and elaborates thusly: “For what is improbable does happen [often], and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable.’ “ Aristotle believes that one can avoid this imposture by distinguishing between “general” and “specific” probability, and apparently intends by the former the statistical sense of frequent occurrence; but he does not establish what he might mean by the probability of an individual event and so leaves the notion of “specific probability” unclear. (shrink)

IT IS well-known that Plato and Aristotle disagree on the possibility of knowledge of nature. Plato maintains that knowledge, in contrast with belief, is never mistaken, that the objects of knowledge are always the same and never becoming, and that what we sense is always becoming. He concludes that knowledge is possible only of objects that are unchanging and separate from sensibles, i.e., the forms. Aristotle rejects this conclusion and recognizes knowledge of sensibles. Surprisingly, though, he accepts Plato's (...) assumptions. He too maintains that knowledge is not sometimes true and sometimes false, but always true ; he distinguishes the sensibles from the unchanging eternal beings ; and he asserts that the objects of knowledge "always are or are for the most part", and occasionally he even claims that they cannot be otherwise. The problem is, how can Aristotle accept Plato's assumptions about the nature and objects of knowledge and still maintain that knowledge of nature is possible? (shrink)

As Aristotle before him, Quine has earned a just renown for his exposure of untenable dualisms: he is best-known, of course, for his rejection of the ‘dogma’ of the radical distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. But another dualism which Quine has no use for has scarcely caused a murmuring in the assembly of philosophers, where Quine’s opposition to the analytic-synthetic dichotomy placed him on the far left, because on this matter he has aligned himself with the philosophical right, (...) with what has been the establishment since Hume. (shrink)

These comments focus on the Platonic-Aristotelian identification of mental health with virtue and mental illness with vice, which connects Plato and Aristotle directly to contemporary discussions arising out of Szasz and anti-psychiatry. It is argued that though one Aristotelian characterization of virtue-the rational adjustment of emotion to cause and context-fits mental health exactly, Aristotle's account of mental illness as "disunity" may be questioned. First, some forms of "disunity" may actually be aspects of mental health. Secondly, some psychiatric disorders-notably (...) some personality disorders-are more obviously related to vice and weak will, and therefore lie more obviously on a continuum with virtue, than others. It is also suggested that this limitation on the account of mental illness as "disunity" may have been intended by Aristotle himself. (shrink)

Boethius, “the first of the scholastics,” had an influence on the Latin Middle Ages that is difficult to overestimate. His translations of and commentaries on Aristotle’s philosophical and logical works were the main conduit between the Greek classical culture and the early Middle Ages. His two commentaries on Aristotle’s Peri Hermenias (“On Interpretation”), the longer of which is translated in the present two volumes (the first covering Books 1–3 and the second Books 4–6), were particularly influential. Unfortunately, those (...) seeking to understand this aspect of Boethius will find little to encourage them here. Aquinas is mentioned once (on the book jacket), and Augustine only a few times. About other .. (shrink)

This book is part of a larger study of the problem of the one and the many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Although this portion can be read and understood on its own, some remarks about the contents of the two sister volumes will be helpful.

Early modern scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy is now a growing area of study. However, little attention has been paid to the structure and form of late Aristotelian texts, partly because they have often been seen as baroque and excessively intricate in construction. This article examines the role of structural and stylistic issues in the De anima commentary of the Jesuit author Hieronymus Dandinus, focusing particularly on the techniques he used to integrate knowledge from other disciplines and expand the familiar commentary (...) format. It argues that taking these issues seriously has important implications for our understanding of the dynamics of reading Aristotle in the early modern period. (shrink)

Taking into account significant developments in the metaphysical thinking of E. J. Lowe over the past 20 years, _More Kinds of Being:A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms_ presents a thorough reworking and expansion of the 1989 edition of _Kinds of Being_ Brings many of the original ideas and arguments put forth in _Kinds of Being_ thoroughly up to date in light of new developments Features a thorough reworking and expansion of the earlier work, rather (...) than just a new edition Reflects the author's conversion to what he calls 'the four-category ontology,' a metaphysical system that takes its inspiration from Aristotle Provides a unified discussion of individuation and identity that should prove to be essential reading for philosophers working in metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotle conceives happiness not primarily as an exercise of virtue in private or with friends, but as the exercise of virtue in governing an ideal state. The best states are knit together so tightly that the interests of one person are the same as the interests of all. Hence, a person who acts for his or her own good must also act for the good of all fellow citizens. It follows that discussions of Aristotle’s (...) altruism and egoism are misconceived. (shrink)

Context -- Overview of themes -- Reading the text -- Reception and influence.